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This paper proposes a partial equality-of-opportunity ordering based on the inequality-of-
opportunity curve, a mechanism that gives preference to those who are worse in terms of 
opportunity. Moreover, it provides a complete ordering that depends on a sensitivity parameter 
representing the degree of priority in the equality-of-opportunity policy. The Moreno-Ternero 
approach is obtained as a particular case. This proposal is applied to a set of 11 countries to 
compare their degree of equality of opportunity. Results show the relevance for economic policy of 
observing inequality of opportunity over tranches. Denmark dominates, in terms of posttax 
income, all other economies. 
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1. Introduction 
The modern economic theory of justice recognizes that an individual’s outcome (for 
example, income, life expectancy or wage-earning capacity) is a function of effort (for 
example, investment in human capital, number of hours worked and occupational choice) 
and circumstances (for example, genes, socioeconomic and cultural background, race and 
sex). However, individuals are only responsible for their effort, because circumstances 
are beyond the individual’s control. Society should, therefore, compensate individuals 
who suffer from bad circumstances but let the agents exercise their responsibility without 
trying to distort their outcomes. Opportunities must be equalized (leveling the playing 
field) before the competition starts, but after it begins, individuals are on their own. 
The measurement of equality of opportunity is concerned with this level-playing-field 
principle.
1 A first difficulty in this theory is to determine the line separating effort from 
circumstances. If we suppose that society has reached a political agreement on the list of 
circumstances then a second difficulty appears: how to make outcome comparisons 
between individuals. To do this, people with the same set of circumstances are grouped 
into types, and then comparisons across types are carried out. Types are constructed 
according to circumstances like parents’ education or intelligence quotient. 
The final step is the determination of a policy that allocates some finite amount of 
resources across types so that it makes the degree to which an individual achieves the 
outcome a function only of his/her effort. Typically, a different policy arises for each 
individual so a compromise is required. Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002 and 2003) proposes 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002 and 2003), Van de Gaer (1993), Peragine (2002 and 2004), 
Roemer et al. (2003), Ruiz-Castillo (2003), Betts and Roemer (2006), Lefranc et al. (2006a and 2006b), 
Moreno-Ternero (2007), Ooghe et al. (2007) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007).   2
implementing the policy that maximizes the average of the outcome enjoyed by the 
worst-off type at each relative effort level. Moreno-Ternero (2007) proposes (from a pure 
equity framework) to minimize the average of outcome inequality across relative effort 
levels. Both proposals rely on the average. Therefore, every tranche receives the same 
weight independently of the degree of inequality of opportunity suffered by individuals at 
each tranche. 
In this paper, we propose a program that is sensitive to the magnitude of inequality of 
opportunity at each tranche. In particular, we propose a priority axiom according to 
which equality-of-opportunity policy should allocate resources giving preference to those 
who are worse off. In doing so, an equality-of-opportunity partial ordering is provided. 
This partial ordering is based on the inequality-of-opportunity curve, a mechanism 
adapted from the poverty literature. However, this ordinal criterion is not conclusive if 
inequality-of-opportunity curves cross. For that case, a complete ordering is also 
provided. The proposed cardinal program will depend on a sensitivity parameter that 
represents the degree of priority in the inequality-of-opportunity policy. A particular case 
of this complete ordering is the Moreno-Ternero approach. This proposal resorts to a pure 
equity framework where we are only concerned with equalizing the outcome of all 
individuals, across types, who expended the same relative effort. 
Both proposals, a partial ordering and a complete ordering, are applied to a set of 11 
countries to compare their degree of equality of opportunity. The dataset for this 
empirical exercise is the data used in Roemer et al. (2003) and Lefranc et al. (2006b). 
Results show the relevance for economic policy of observing inequality of opportunity at 
each tranche because inequality of opportunity over tranches has a particular shape in   3
each country. Moreover, posttax income experiences a lower level of inequality of 
opportunity than pretax income, although that particular equalization of inequality of 
opportunity is not homogenous among countries. By economies, Denmark and Spain are 
the best and worst countries, respectively, in the sample in terms of inequality of 
opportunity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of equality-of-
opportunity measurement. Section 3 presents an intuitive version of the proposal. The 
partial ordering and the complete ordering are presented in Section 4, and the empirical 
exercise is summarized in Section 5. The final section includes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Equality-of-opportunity measurement 
In this section, we summarize several approaches to equality-of-opportunity measurement 
but first we provide some notation and definitions. 
Let the members of a population enjoy a certain kind of advantage u, for example, 
income, life expectancy or wage-earning capacity. This advantage is a function of the 
amount of effort e they expend and the amount of resources they consume x. Moreover, 
population is partitioned into a set of types t ={1, …, T}, where all individuals in a type 
have the same set of circumstances. Therefore, the achieved level of advantage enjoyed 
by an individual of type t is u
t (x, e). 
Suppose that there exists an amount w per capita of the resource to allocate among 
individuals. In order to achieve equality of opportunity, society must choose a policy for 
allocating w among the population. Let ϕ 
t:ℜ + →ℜ + be an allocation rule that indicates 
the amount of the resource that an individual of type t receives with respect to the effort   4
she/he exerts. Then, the T-tuple  ( )
T ϕ ϕ ϕ ., . . ,
1 =  ∈ Φ is the policy of the social planner, 
where Φ is the set of feasible policies. 
Finally, assume that the distribution of effort exerted by individuals of type t is 
t F
ϕ  and 
that  () ϕ π,
t e  is the level of effort exerted by the individual at the 
th π  quantile of that 
effort distribution when facing the policy ϕ.
2 We may hence define the indirect advantage 
function as follows: 
 
() )) , ( )), , ( ( ( , ϕ π ϕ π ϕ ϕ π
t t t t t e e u v = . (1) 
 
In what follows, we assume that π is a discrete variable but the analogous result applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to an infinite set. 
According to the equality of opportunity from Roemer’s pragmatic approach (1993, 
1998, 2002 and 2003), two persons of different types have tried equally hard if and only 
if they are on the same rank of their respective effort distributions.
3 Then, a policy that 
equalizes opportunities is a policy that equalizes advantage across types, for given 
quantiles of effort expended. At this point, Roemer proposes to maximize the minimum 
level of advantage, across types, of individuals who exert the same degree of effort π 
th: 
 
                                                 
2 Note that the level of effort depends on the whole policy not just the allocation rule for type t (see 
Roemer, 2003, for this generalization).  
3 The use of rank π as an interpersonally comparable measure of effort is precisely justified in Roemer 












R v . (2) 
 
Typically, we will have a different policy for each quantile. To adopt a compromise 
between so hypothetical a bundle of policies, Roemer proposes to give the same weight 



















ϕ ϕ π ϕ  (3) 
 
where Q is the number of quantiles; for example, Q =100 for centiles. 
An alternative program has been proposed in Van de Gaer (1993). This approach focuses 
on the set of outcomes available to the members of each type (opportunity set). The 



















ϕ ϕ π ϕ . (4) 
 
We do not consider this approach in this paper because it does not allow the 
consideration of individual advantage by levels of relative effort. 
Recently, different approaches have been proposed in the literature to take into account 
all the outcomes at each quantile, not just the minimum outcome. Peragine (2004)   6
proposed two different methods to make ordinal welfare comparisons according to 
equality of opportunity. In the first method, the Generalized Lorenz Curve at each 
quantile for both income distributions must be compared, so Q different dominance 
conditions should be checked. If the number of quantiles, which must be examined to 
guarantee a close approximation of the responsibility exercised, is large, the application 
of this method may be too laborious. In the second method, the Generalized Lorenz 
Curve of the outcome distribution, in which each individual receives the mean of his/her 
type, must be compared. Dominance according to this method is a much less demanding 
criterion; in fact, dominance according to the first approach implies dominance according 
to the second method. However, this second method does not take into account dispersion 
in types.
4 
Moreno-Ternero (2007) provides (from a pure equity framework) some alternative 
mechanisms to construct equality-of-opportunity policies. A first mechanism considers 
that equality-of-opportunity policy must minimize the average of advantage inequality 
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ϕ ϕ π ϕ π ϕ  (5) 
 
                                                 
4 This can cause some problems. For example, assume two different outcome distributions with two types. 
In the first distribution, there is equality of opportunity. In the second distribution, type means are alike but 
there is some inequality of opportunity. If we apply the proposed method, we will conclude that both 
distributions are equivalent. 
   7
where I (⋅) is an inequality index. A second proposal minimizes the maximum inequality 
throughout the different levels of relative effort. Finally, he proposes to minimize the 
inequality between the average outcome of each type of individual. In this case, program 
(4) is reformulated as follows: 
 
) ) ; (
1
















ϕ ϕ π ϕ π ϕ . (6) 
 
This paper generalizes the first two mechanisms. The last program is not considered 
because it does not allow (as in the Van de Gaer approach) the treatment of individual 
advantage by relative levels of effort. 
Notice that Moreno-Ternero (2007) assumes that policies in Φ allocate the available 
resource w completely among individuals. In this manner, he rules out the policy that 
gives zero to every type, which might reach a higher (but undesirable) degree of equality. 
For the same reason, I make the same assumption throughout the paper. 
Lefranc  et al. (2006a) propose a mechanism to contrast equality of opportunity in a 
model that considers not only circumstances and effort, but also luck. They contrast strict 
equality of opportunity (outcome distributions conditional on effort are equal) and weak 
equality of opportunity (there are not unanimous preferences over the range of possible 
circumstances for all possible increasing utility functions that exhibit risk aversion) by   8
using the first and second stochastic dominance criterions.
5 Unfortunately, as the authors 
acknowledge, this characterization of equality of opportunity does not allow us to rank 
situations in which equality of opportunity is rejected. To avoid this problem, they 
propose a new index to measure the degree of inequality of opportunity (see Lefranc et 




3. An intuitive version of the proposal 
Here we provide a simple example with three different populations to show the relevance 
of the proposed method. Let us assume two types in each population and the same 
distribution of advantage within-type 1 for all of them (see Figures 1a, 1b and 1c). 
 






                                                 
5 Recall that second-order stochastic dominance is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance (Shorrocks, 
1983). 
6 Dworkin (1981a and 1981b) claims that option luck (luck that is avoidable) should not be compensated. 
On the contrary, Fleurbaey (1995), and other authors, have provided arguments for full compensation for 
this type of luck. Moreover, libertarians, according to their strong form of self-ownership, consider that 


































It is easy to observe that the same equality-of-opportunity policy arises from these three 
populations, although they have a completely different distribution of advantage within-
type 2. This happens whichever program in (3) or (4) is applied. This result is surprising. 
In the first population, there is equality of opportunity in the range [0, 0.5] as individuals 
in both types achieve the same amount of advantage in that range (see Figure 1a). 
However, they are taken into account in the policy program. This might provoke an 
inefficient allocation of resources because the recommended policy could give resources 
to people who do not suffer from inequality of opportunity. Worse still, resources 
transferred from the planner to people of the first type who are in the range [0, 0.5] would 
introduce inequality of opportunity where it did not exist before. Then, policy should be 
applied to tranches where inequality of opportunity exists, that is, to tranches where 
circumstances are not irrelevant. This intuitive result calls for a focus axiom: only the 
tranches where there is inequality of opportunity matter. This axiom is broadly used in 
poverty analysis where incomes of the nonpoor are irrelevant for the calculation of 
poverty (see, for example, the survey in Zheng, 1997). In the same way, we propose the 
use of this axiom in the equality-of-opportunity framework. Notice that Moreno-
Ternero’s (2007) approaches satisfy this axiom by construction. Thus, for instance, the 
program in (5) considers the inequality of outcomes across quantiles; therefore, tranches 
where individuals with different circumstances obtain the same outcome do not 
contribute to the total inequality. Notice, however, that the number of quantiles where 
there are not differences in outcomes is relevant to inequality-of-opportunity 
measurement.
7 
                                                 
7 In the poverty context, Seidl (1988) provides a version of the focus axiom, which says a poverty measure   10
Now, let us concentrate on a different problem. The programs in (3) and (5) give the 
same weight to every quantile; therefore, they just consider the average. A consequence 
of this is that the same aggregate statistic may be consistent with very different 
distributions of outcomes. For example, the outcome distributions in Figures 1b and 1c 
produce the same policy, although inequality of opportunity is distributed in a very 
different manner. Of course, if inequality of opportunity is homogenous over quantiles, 
the average is the appropriate statistic; however, this is not the generally observed case 
(see, for example, Figure 3 in Section 5). 
Because equality-of-opportunity policies should allocate resources among all the tranches 
where there is inequality of opportunity, it is reasonable to adopt a policy based on the 
complete distribution. Of course, an approach like this will depend on the aggregation 
method that is applied. Furthermore, the aggregation method will imply a range of 
different judgments about how differentials are aggregated. Note, however, that the 
average procedure also implies a judgment of value: all tranches, regardless of the size of 
their inequality of opportunity, receive the same weight by the policy maker. 
Let us order the tranches according to their inequality of opportunity, measured by an 
inequality index, in an inverse way, that is, from the largest to the lowest observed 
inequality of opportunity. In principle, three options are possible: a concave, a linear or a 
convex aggregation. In the concave case, the larger the inequality of opportunity in the 
tranche, the higher the weight it will receive. The linear case is the one established in the 
literature, where all tranches receive the same weight. In the convex case, the larger the 
inequality of opportunity in the tranche, the smaller the weight it will receive. In this 
                                                                                                                                                 
is independent of the number of nonpoor.   11
paper, we propose the concave aggregation of tranches. In that case, the equality-of-
opportunity policy would allocate resources giving preference to those who are worse off. 
This aggregation method does not depend on the effort distribution like, for example, the 
Fleurbaey (2002) proposal; therefore, the value judgments that the social planner would 
adopt are not about charity (see Roemer, 2003) but priority in the allocation of resources. 
A new axiom, therefore, may be imposed: the priority axiom.
8 Once this axiom is 
assumed, the equality-of-opportunity policy is sensitive to the distribution of inequality of 
opportunity, across tranches. As a result, outcome distributions in Figures 1b and 1c are 
not considered alike anymore. 
Another advantage of considering these two axioms is that an ordinal method for 
comparing distributions is applicable. We see in the next section that an inequality-of-
opportunity curve can be constructed for making ordinal comparisons. This dominance 
criteria is an adaptation of the TIP’s dominance criteria applied in the poverty literature 
(see Spencer and Fisher, 1992; Jenkins and Lambert, 1997 and 1998; Shorrocks, 1998; 
and Zheng, 2000).
9 Furthermore, in the case that inequality-of-opportunity curves cross, a 





                                                 
8 Parfit (1997) defines the term prioritarism as the view that worse off individuals should be given priority 
over the better off with respect to resource allocation, but the former need not necessarily receive the 
extreme priority that characterizes maximin. 
9 The TIP curve is also called cumulative poverty gap curve or poverty gap profile.   12
4. The model 
Consider the vector of outcome inequality between types across quantiles,  ( ) Q I I y ,..., 1 =  
where  Q is the number of quantiles, I ( ⋅) is an inequality index and 




j j v v I I =  for all j =1,…, Q. Let p(y) be the level of inequality of 
opportunity in distribution y for a given measure p (⋅). We now impose the focus axiom 
and the priority axiom
10 over the measure p (⋅). 
 
Focus axiom: If Iz = 0 for any z∈{0,…, Q}, then p(y) = p(y–z) where y–z is the vector y 
without the element Iz. 
This axiom states that quantiles with no inequality between types are not taken into 
account when measuring aggregated inequality of opportunity. 
 
Priority axiom:
11 If Ii > Iz for any i and z ∈ {1,…, Q}, then a transfer of an outcome that 
reduces inequality of opportunity in quantile i and increases inequality of opportunity in 
quantile z by the same amount, that is,  z i I I ∆ − = ∇ , without any reranking between Ii and 
Iz, reduces p(y). 
The distribution of inequality of opportunity across quantiles is relevant. In particular, the 
larger the inequality of that distribution, the higher the inequality-of-opportunity index 
p(⋅). 
                                                 
10 See Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006) for a different formal definition of the priority axiom. 
11 This formulation is an adaptation of the weak transfer axiom in the income inequality literature. It 
originally states that any income transfer between two persons, from the richer to the poorer without any 
reranking, reduces income inequality.   13
Moreover, if three common axioms like continuity, anonymity and monotonicity are also 
considered we will be able to develop a dominance criterion to rank distributions 
according to their inequality-of-opportunity level.
12 Next, we will propose a 
correspondence between these rankings and those obtained by using complete inequality 
of opportunity indexes that also satisfy these axioms. 
 
Continuity axiom:  p(⋅) must be a continuous function for any vector y of outcome 
inequality between types, across quantiles. 
 This axiom guarantees that small changes in the inequality within quantiles produce a 
small change in the level of inequality of opportunity. 
 
Between-tranche anonymity axiom: p(y) = p(A·y) where A is a permutation matrix. 
This axiom guarantees that the inequality-of-opportunity index does not favor any 
particular quantile. 
 
Weak monotonicity axiom: Let y0 and y1 be two vectors of outcome inequality between 




i I I > . Then, p(y0) > p(y1). 
An increase in the outcome inequality within a particular quantile implies a worsening of 
inequality of opportunity. 
                                                 
12 In other frameworks, for example, poverty analysis (see Chakravarty, 1983, and Thon, 1983) and wage 
discrimination (see Jenkins, 1994, and Del Rio et al., 2006), a replication axiom is also imposed. However, 
this axiom is not necessary in our case, because we consider the same number of quantiles for every 
distribution.   14
Now the inequality-of-opportunity curve will be defined so as to satisfy the above 
axioms. 





1 ... Q I I I ≥ ≥ ≥ . The inequality-of-opportunity curve represents, for 
each  1 0 ≤ ≤ q , the sum of the first 100·q percent of 
'
i I  values divided by the total number 

















q =  and r is any integer such that  Q r ≤ .
13 Actually, this curve is the Inverse 
Generalized Lorenz Curve (see Jenkins and Lambert, 1997 and 1998; and Shorrocks, 
1998) defined for the values of outcome inequality between types across quantiles. 
The inequality-of-opportunity curve in (7) is an increasing and concave function that 
takes the value zero at the origin and a constant value of 
Q
r*
, where r* is the last tranche 
with positive outcome inequality between types (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
13 If we assume π is a continuous variable and consider H to be the distribution of inequality between types 
across quantiles, we have:  ]. 1 , 0 [ , ) ( ) ; (
1
1
1 ∈ = ∫
−
− q dq q H q H O
q
 See Shorrocks (1998) for a derivation 
of this expression in the deprivation literature.   15







This curve gives information about the incidence, intensity and dispersion of inequality 
of opportunity. The length of the nonhorizontal portion of the curve reveals the 
proportion of quantiles with positive inequality of opportunity, that is, the incidence of 
inequality of opportunity. The height of the curve informs us about the intensity of 
inequality of opportunity: the higher the curve, the larger the total inequality of 
opportunity. The curve is the horizontal axis if there is no inequality of opportunity in 
society. Finally, the degree of concavity of the curve shows the dispersion in the 
distribution of inequality of opportunity. In particular, the curve is the 45° line if each 
quantile experiences the same inequality of opportunity. Notice that the inequality-of-
opportunity curve defined in (7) satisfies all the axioms above. 
The dominance of one equality-of-opportunity curve over another is the criterion to rank 
distributions according to their inequality-of-opportunity level. 
Assume two different distributions of outcome inequality between types across quantiles, 
'
1 y  and 
'
2 y . We say that distribution 
'
1 y  dominates distribution 
'










































1 ∈ ∀ ≤ q q y O q y O . Let P be the set of inequality-of-
opportunity indexes that satisfy the axioms above, then a useful result follows (see 
Marshall and Olkin, 1979; Jenkins and Lambert, 1993; and Shorrocks, 1993 and 1998).
14 
 
Result: Given outcome inequality (between types, across quantiles) distributions 
'
1 y  
and
'
2 y , dominance of 
'
1 y  over 
'




1 y p y p ≤  for 
any p(·) ∈ P. 
 
That is, population A is better off than population B, according to all aggregate indexes 
of inequality of opportunity that satisfy the focus, priority, continuity, between-tranche 
anonymity and weak monotonicity axioms if and only if its inequality-of-opportunity 
curve goes below the inequality-of-opportunity curve for population B in the entire 
domain. 
However, this ordinal criterion is not conclusive about whether inequality-of-opportunity 
curves cross. In this case, a complete ordering can be achieved by applying inequality-of-
opportunity indexes that satisfy the axioms above (elements of P). This set of indexes is 
actually the set of poverty indexes that satisfy the axioms above, adapted to our 
inequality-of-opportunity framework, where we have vectors of outcome inequality. 
Then, given the set of poverty indexes that satisfy the axioms above (see Zheng, 1997), 
we propose to adapt the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty measures (see Foster 
et al., 1984). This choice is based on its simplicity (see expression 8 below), its subgroup 
                                                 
14 This result was used for wage discrimination measurement in Jenkins (1994) and Del Rio et al. (2006).   17
consistency (this family is consistent with a change in the inequality-of-opportunity level 
of a subgroup of quantiles)
 15 and the fact that the first two mechanisms developed by 
Moreno-Ternero are obtained as particular cases. Thus, the proposed program is as 
follows: 
 



















j j v v I I =  and  γ is a sensitivity parameter that represents the 
degree of priority in the inequality-of-opportunity policy: the higher the parameter value, 
the larger the weight that quantiles with larger outcome inequality will receive. This 
family of inequality-of-opportunity measures is the proportion of quantiles with positive 
inequality of opportunity, that is, the incidence of inequality of opportunity, when  0 = γ . 
The linear case ( 1 = γ ) is the first Moreno-Ternero mechanism. Finally, the quantiles 
with larger outcome inequality receive higher weights (priority axiom) when  1 > γ . A 
consequence of the latter is that the minimization of maximum inequality throughout the 
different levels of relative effort (the second Moreno-Ternero mechanism) is applied 
when γ converges to infinite. 
In the next section, we apply these proposals to a sample of countries. 
 
                                                 
15 As a matter of fact, this family of measures verifies a stronger condition: additive decomposability (see 
Foster and Shorrocks, 1991).    18
5. Partial and complete orderings among countries 
The dataset for this empirical exercise (see Table 1) is the data used in Roemer et al. 
(2003), which contain information on 11 countries: Belgium (1992), Denmark (1993), 
France (1994), Great Britain (1991), Italy (1993), The Netherlands (1995), Norway 
(1995), Spain (1991), Sweden (1991), the United States (1991) and West Germany 
(1994).
16,17 Samples refer to individuals who are male heads of household 25 to 40 years 
old (30 to 40 years old for Denmark, 25 to 50 years old for West Germany). Pretax 
income is calculated as the individual’s labor income plus the household capital income 
divided by the number of adults in the household (calculations do not include self-
employed income, nor capital income for Belgium). Posttax income is calculated as 
pretax income plus cash transfers from the government, minus income tax payments and 
social security contributions. Tax payments were simulated for all countries other than 
the Nordic economies. Moreover, the samples are partitioned into types based on 
individual parents’ level of education for all countries except France and Great Britain 
where the occupational typology is used. Finally, the population of these countries is split 
into centiles, that is, Q =100 (see Roemer, 1998). 
First, we compute the mean income of each type at each quantile. We need to reduce 
income dispersion within types at each quantile into its mean income to keep separate 
inequality because of circumstances and inequality because of effort (see Ruiz-Castillo, 
2003). Then, the Gini coefficient is applied to measure income inequality between types 
                                                 
16 I am grateful to John Roemer and Nicolas Pistolesi for providing this dataset. The authors of this dataset 
were: I. Marx (Belgian data), T. Tranaes (Danish data), A. Lefranc and A. Trannoy (French data), S. 
Jenkins (British data), U. Colombino (Italian data), E. Pommer (Dutch data), R. Aaberge (Norwegian data), 
J. Ruiz-Castillo, M. J. San Segundo and I. Zubiri (Spanish data), J. Fritzell (Swedish data), M. Page and J. 
Roemer (US data) and G. G. Wagner (German data). 
17 East Germany was also included in Roemer et al. (2003). However, we disregard this data (following 
Lefranc et al., 2006b) because West Germany and East Germany were very different economies in 1994.   19
at each quantile. Figure 3 shows inequality of opportunity for pretax and posttax incomes 
by tranches. The relevance of observing inequality of opportunity at each tranche 
becomes apparent. Inequality of opportunity in every country has a particular shape that 
calls for different policy responses. For example, inequality of opportunity in the USA 
and Spain is completely different. Inequality of opportunity in the USA is concentrated at 
the lower levels of relative effort while inequality of opportunity in Spain is concentrated 
at the last three deciles of relative effort. Thus, there is a significant problem regarding 
incentives in Spain that does not appear in the USA: incomes at high levels of relative 
effort depend on circumstances much more than incomes at low and middle levels of 
relative effort. As a consequence, the Spanish might be avoiding very high levels of 
relative effort because incomes there depend too much on circumstances. 
 
Table 1. Country databases
18 
Country Year  Database  Observations
Belgium  1992  Panel survey of Belgian households (PSBH)  933 
Denmark  1993  Danish integrated database for labor market research 
with income registers (IDA-ISR) 
 
32070 
France  1994  French household survey (BdF)  2763 
Great Britain  1991  British household panel survey (BHPS)  991 
Italy  1993  Italian survey of household income and wealth (SHIW)  1435 
The Netherlands  1995  Dutch facilities-use survey (AVO)  1758 
Norway  1995  Norwegian survey of level of living (SLL)  576 
Spain  1991  Spanish survey on class structure, social biography and 
class consciousness (ECBC)  1986 
Sweden  1991  Swedish level of living survey (LNU)  823 
USA  1991  Panel study of income dynamics (PSID)  1140 
West Germany  1994  German socioeconomic panel (GSOEP)  1113 
                                                 
18 We have not considered observations whose type is unknown.    20
Another relevant fact from Figure 3 is the different role of taxes. Here we do not estimate 
the extent to which each country’s fiscal system equalizes opportunity for income as in 
Roemer et al. (2003); however, we can appreciate the difference between the inequality-
of-opportunity distributions before and after taxes. We examine this issue empirically 
after the presentation of cardinal orderings among countries (see below). In general 
terms, posttax income experiences lower inequality of opportunity than pretax income. 
However, the equalization of inequality of opportunity is not homogenous among 
countries. We can distinguish between three groups of economies: first, Denmark and 
Sweden, where inequality of opportunity in terms of posttax income is much lower than 
in terms of pretax income. In this sense, Roemer et al. (2003) reported that these two 
economies had taxed more than equality of opportunity would have required; second, 
countries like West Germany, Spain, Italy and the USA, where differences in inequality 
of opportunity between pretax income and posttax income are small. Roemer et al. 
(2003) reported that Italy and the USA clearly had low effective tax systems. However, 
they considered West Germany as one of the economies that had been overtaxing; third, 
Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Great Britain and Norway, where differences in 
inequality of opportunity before and after taxes are intermediated. Two countries, The 
Netherlands and Norway, are classified as overtaxing economies in Roemer et al. (2003); 





                                                 
19 Roemer et al. (2003) used data on IQ tests taken during youth for four countries: Denmark, Sweden, The 
Netherlands and the USA.   21
Figure 3. Inequality of opportunity by tranches. 
 


















































































































































































































































   22












































































































































































































Partial orderings among countries are represented in Table 2 (pretax income) and Table 3 
(posttax income). These partial orderings are based on the dominance relationship between   23
inequality-of-opportunity curves (see Section 4). To contrast the dominance property we 
have applied the bootstrap method. Cowell and Flachaire (2007) find that bootstrap tests 
usually improve numerical performance. Moreover, with small sample sizes it could be better 
to use a bootstrap approach that guarantees a better level of approximation to the nominal 
confidence intervals (Davison and Hinkley, 2005). The procedure we have adopted is the 
following: 
1. Compute confidence intervals for every inequality-of-opportunity curve according to the 
percentile method at the 0.05 level.
20 The number of replications (R) and quantiles are 1000 
and 100, respectively. 
2. If confidence intervals for two inequality-of-opportunity curves do not cross, the curve that 
is below at every tranche dominates the curve above. Otherwise (see Figure 4), significance 
tests are applied to assess the dominance hypotheses (step 3). 
3. Given any two economies, A and B, the null hypothesis to be contrasted at every centile q 
is:  0 ) ( ) ( : 0 ≥ −
B A q O q O H . This hypothesis is a composite hypothesis, which means that 
some aspects of the distribution remain unknown, for example, in our case the variance is 
unspecified. For this hypothesis, we can use the statistic 
B A q O q O T ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ − =  (see Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1993). However, the distribution of this statistic is unknown; therefore, we use 
the bootstrap distribution of T ˆ  at every centile q. A clean solution for this problem is to 
choose Student’s t-test for a normal difference of means with unknown variances (see 
Kendall and Stuart, 1968). Notice that the normality assumption is derived from the 
                                                 
20 The advantages of the percentile method in comparison with other approaches are discussed by Gray et 
al. (2003) and Moran (2005).   24
normality of the asymptotic distribution for the estimate of the Gini index (see, among others, 
Cowell, 1989 and Bishop et al., 1998) and equation (7). 
 
Table 2. Partial ordering (pretax income) 
  Dn Fr GB It Nd Nw Sp Sw USA WG 
Be  ↑ X ↑  X  ↑  ↑  X X  X  ↑ 
Dn   X  X  X  X  X  X X  X  X 
Fr     ↑ X X X X X  X  ↑ 
GB      X X X X  X  ↓ X 
It       X X ↓ X  X  X 
Nd        X X X  X  ↑ 
Nw         X X  X  ↑ 
Sp         X X ↑ 
Sw            X  ↑ 
USA              ↑ 
X: Inequality-of-opportunity curves cross; ↑: The column dominates the row; ↓: The row dominates the 
column. 
 
Table 3. Partial ordering (posttax income) 
  Dn Fr GB It Nd Nw Sp Sw USA WG 
Be  ↑ X ↑  X X X  ↓ X  X  ↑ 
Dn    ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
Fr      X  ↓ X X ↓ X  ↓ X 
GB       X X  ↓  ↓  X  ↓  ↑ 
It        X X ↓ X  X  ↑ 
Nd         X X  ↑  ↓ X 
Nw         ↓ X  X  ↑ 
Sp          ↑  X  ↑ 
Sw             ↓ X 
USA               ↑ 
X: Inequality-of-opportunity curves cross; ↑: The column dominates the row; ↓: The row dominates the 
column.   25
It is clear from Tables 2 and 3 that tax systems may be effective tools to reduce inequality of 
opportunity. Thus, Denmark dominates, in terms of posttax income, all other economies 
although it only dominates one economy (Belgium) according to pretax income. Meanwhile, 
West Germany does not change, or even marginally worsens its position among countries. 
Both countries are the best positioned economies in the sample in terms of inequality of 
opportunity: West Germany in terms of pretax income and Denmark in terms of posttax 
income. On the contrary, Spain and the USA are the worst economies in the sample in terms 
of posttax income. 
 
Figure 4. Inequality-of-opportunity curves (posttax income). 





































Confidence interval (The Netherlands)
   26
In Section 4 we said that a partial ordering is not conclusive if inequality-of-opportunity 
curves cross. This means that unanimity among inequality-of-opportunity indexes for all 
parameters of priority γ is not possible. For example, inequality of opportunity of posttax 
income in The Netherlands is lower than inequality of opportunity in France across the entire 
domain apart from the first centiles of effort. Their inequality-of-opportunity curves (and 
confidence intervals) cross at the beginning (see Figure 4). Therefore, if the degree of priority 
γ is large enough, The Netherlands will show higher inequality of opportunity than France 
because the former possess the highest inequality-of-opportunity level. 
In Table 4 (pretax income) and Table 5 (posttax income) we present the values of the index 
in (8) for γ = 1, 2 and 3. Moreover, we provide the standard error estimates calculated by 









2 * * 1
) ˆ ( ˆ σ  (see, for example, Davison 
and Hinkley, 2005). In general terms, cardinal results reproduce the main conclusions of the 
ordinal measure. Thus, Denmark and Spain are the best and worst countries in the sample 
respectively in terms of inequality of opportunity. Moreover, the three groups of countries 
that we intuitively found in Figure 3 are better appreciated now: in Denmark and Sweden the 
decrease in inequality of opportunity (for γ = 1) is larger than 60 percent. Inequality of 
opportunity is reduced by 20 percent or less (for γ = 1) after tax in West Germany, Spain, 
Italy and the USA. Meanwhile, the change in inequality of opportunity is around 30 or 40 
percent for γ = 1 in Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Great Britain and Norway. We see 
that as Roemer et al. (2003) conclude, fiscal policy may compete with other instruments for 
equalizing opportunities like education. 
   27
Table 4. Inequality of opportunity (pretax income)
a 
γ  Be Dn Fr GB  I  Nd Nw Sp  Sw  USA  WG 


































































a Results are multiplied by 10
3. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 5. Inequality of opportunity (posttax income)
a 
γ  Be Dn Fr GB  I  Nd Nw Sp  Sw  USA  WG 


































































a Results are multiplied by 10
3. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and discussion 
This paper suggests that equality-of-opportunity policies should allocate resources 
according to the degree of inequality of opportunity at each level of relative effort. The 
social planner would allocate resources giving preference to those who are worse off. If 
this proposal is adopted as a simple tool, the inequality-of-opportunity curve will allow us 
to make ordinal comparisons in terms of equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, those   28
ordinal comparisons may not be conclusive. In that case, a cardinal program that depends 
on the degree of priority in the inequality-of-opportunity policy is presented. The 
Moreno-Ternero (2007) approach is obtained as a particular case. 
In the empirical exercise, we found that West Germany is the best positioned economy in 
the sample in terms of pretax income. Meanwhile, Denmark dominates in terms of 
posttax income all other economies. On the contrary, Spain and the USA are the worst 
economies in the sample in terms of posttax income. 
Thus far, we have not discussed the framework of this proposal. Roemer’s methodology 
resorts to a welfare objective; however, the mechanism presented here focuses on the 
design of equal opportunity policies in a pure equity framework. This means that we are 
only concerned with equalizing the outcome of all individuals, across types, who 
expended a given degree of relative effort. Efficiency, therefore, is secondary. As 
Moreno-Ternero (2007) has pointed out this allow us to address relative deprivation that 
may make more sense under several scenarios (see, for example, Brown et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, even if we are only concerned with equal opportunity policies that are 
efficient, the proposal in this paper is still useful because it allows us to make ordinal and 
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